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The behavior of interest rates under the U.S. National Banking System is puzzling because
of the apparent presence of persistent and large unexploited arbitrage opportunities for note
issuing banks. Previous attempts to explain interest rate behavior have relied on the cost or
the inelasticity of note issue. These attempts are not entirely satisfactory. Here we propose
a new rationale to solve the puzzle. Inelastic note issuance arises endogenously because the
marginal cost of issuing notes is an increasing function of circulation. We build a spatial
separation model where some fraction of agents must move each period. Banknotes can
be carried between locations; deposits cannot. Taking the model to the data on national
banks, we ﬁnd it matches the movements in long-term interest rates well. It also predicts
movements in deposit rates during panics. However, the model displays more inelasticity of
notes issuance than is in the data.
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In 1863, the United States established the so-called National Banking System. Under
this system private commercial banks (national banks) were permitted to issue liabilities
(bank notes) that had to be fully collateralized by government bonds deposited with the U.S.
Treasury and that had to be redeemed on demand at par in “lawful money” — specie or legal
tender notes (“greenbacks”). A bank was subject to a tax on its notes, but the tax was
applied only to the quantity of notes actually in circulation.1 The notes of national banks
carried an explicit government guarantee against noteholder loss should the issuing bank fail.
It is generally accepted that national bank notes were perfect substitutes for specie and legal
tender notes in circulation.
Many authors have noted that the behavior of interest rates under the National Bank-
ing System was puzzling, because arbitrage opportunities apparently were left unexploited.2
The collateral constraint on the issue of bank notes was never binding. In fact, national
banks held more government bonds than were required as collateral for the notes they issued.
The perfect substitutability of national bank notes and lawful money would seem to argue
that national banks could keep their notes in circulation indeﬁnitely. They could use these
notes to purchase government bonds or other assets. Proﬁt-maximization suggests that banks
should have bid the price of assets up (the yield on assets down) to the point where the yield
was equal to the banks’ cost of issuing notes. Since these notes were considered perfect sub-
stitutes for lawful money, they carried a nominal interest rate of zero. The tax rate on note
1The tax was assessed on January 10 and July 10 on the average amount of notes that a bank had in
circulation in the six months previous to the assessment date.
2See Bell 1912; Cagan 1963, 1965; Cagan and Schwartz 1991; Champ 1990; Champ, Freeman, and Weber
1999; Champ, Smith, and Williamson 1996; Champ, Wallace, and Weber 1992, 1994; Friedman and Schwartz
1963; Goodhart 1965; James 1976; Kuehlwein 1992.issues was one percent, one-half percent after 1900. The other costs associated with note
issue also should have been relatively constant. Such arbitrage arguments imply that the
yield on government bonds, or other safe assets should have been constant at approximately
one percent up to 1900, then fallen by one-half percent and remained constant at that new
level thereafter.
Asset yields during this period, however, did not follow this pattern. In Figure 1
we plot the yields on three government bonds issues that made up the vast majority of the
collateral for national bank notes at monthly intervals for the period 1882 to 1913.3 The ﬁgure
shows that asset yields were consistently higher than the level implied by the elimination of
arbitrage opportunities. Further, yields were not constant. Instead, yields declined from
1882 through the middle of 1889. From the middle of 1889 through the fall of 1896 bond
yields increased, exceeding their levels in 1882. Yields then declined sharply until 1901 or
1902, depending upon which bond yield is being considered. From 1902 through 1913, bond
yields generally showed a slight upward trend. Thus, the ﬁgure shows that there apparently
were persistent and large arbitrage opportunities during this period. The persistence and
magnitude of these apparent arbitrage opportunities have led Cagan and Schwartz 1991 to
dub this phenomena the “National Bank note puzzle”.4
3During this period, there were only a few issues of government bonds in existence at any point in time.
These issues were all long-term and were identiﬁed by their coupon rate and the date at which they ﬁrst
became callable. Thus, for example, the 4s of 1907 were four percent coupon bonds that were ﬁrst callable
in 1907. The yields shown in Figure 1 are calculations based upon end-of -month bond price data collected
from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle by Bruce Champ and James Thomson and kindly provided to
us. All calculations were done using the “yield” worksheet function in Excel, assuming that coupons are on
the ﬁrst day of the month that they were scheduled to be paid and that bonds were expected to mature on
the ﬁrst date at which they could be called.
4Sometimes the puzzle is stated as, If bank notes issuance was proﬁtable, why were fewer bank notes issued
than was permitted by the constraint that notes had to be collateralized by deposit of government bonds?
For reasons that will become obvious later, we have chosen the alternative of framing the puzzle in terms of
the persistence of an arbitrage opporunity.
2Several solutions to the puzzling behavior of interest rates have been proposed. Some
of these and the reasons we think they are inadequate are discussed below. Our purpose in
this paper is to present another potential solution to the puzzle. Our solution is to modify the
assumption that the costs of bank note issuance were roughly constant across the quantity
of notes issued. Instead, we assume that there is some quantity of notes, what we will
term “cheap notes”, that have a constant and low marginal cost because banks expect that
these notes will stay in circulation for long periods of time. However, they also expect that
notes issued beyond that quantity, particularly those issued in times of high demand, carry
a higher marginal cost. We will call these “expensive notes”. One possible reason these
notes have a higher marginal cost is that such notes could be expected to be returned to the
bank (presented for redemption) very quickly.5 Another possible reason is that note issuance
beyond some point could leave the bank vulnerable to portfolio shocks that would threaten the
bank’s solvency. The presence of this friction in the marginal cost of note issuance introduces
a form of endogenous inelasticity to bank note issuance. This inelasticity permits interest
rates to be higher than the tax rate and to ﬂuctuate with changes in the demand for notes.
We will judge the success of our model by the ability of a reasonably parameterized
version to explain certain secular and cyclical facts during this period. In particular, we want
to explain
5This idea also appears in Champ, Wallace, and Weber 1996, but it is not explicitly modeled there.
3• the level of and movements in long term interest rates
• changes in the quantity of bank notes issued, and
• the magnitudes of the discounts on certiﬁed checks, the quantity of bank notes issued,
and the level of call loan rates during ﬁnancial panics.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review the previous literature. In
section 3, we present the model. In section 4, we discuss some data issues and describe our
parameterization of the model. In section 5, we discuss how well the parameterized model
explains the facts. In section 6, we conclude.
2. Previous explanations
In this section, we present and evaluate some previous suggested solutions to the
puzzling behavior of interest rates under the National Banking System. One of these is
given in Champ, Freeman, and Weber 1999. They argue that the expected cost that banks
have to bear when their notes are presented for redemption should be added to the tax in
terms of evaluating the magnitude of the arbitrage opportunity. However, they ﬁnd that the
magnitude of these costs is not suﬃciently large to make the arbitrage opportunity go away.
Further, they ﬁnd that the secular movements in these costs do not correspond to the secular
movements in asset yields.
Another explanation of the puzzle is given in Champ, Smith, and Williamson 1996.
They build an OLG spatial separation model of bank note issuance. When bank note issuance
is perfectly elastic, the interest rate on loans, which can be considered to be the yield on
government bonds, is equal to the cost of note issue. (The same result is obtained in Champ,
Wallace, and Weber 1996.) However, when note issuance is perfectly inelastic, the interest
4rate on loans is above the cost of note issuance and changes in the demand for bank notes
give rise to interest rate ﬂuctuations. Champ, Smith, and Williamson 1996 argues that the
perfectly inelastic note issuance case more nearly characterizes the National Banking System.
They argue there were institutional constraints, described only as the “mechanics of note
issue,” that prevented national banks from changing the amounts of notes that they had in
circulation, at least in the short run. We agree that in the aggregate, the supply of national
bank notes appears to have been inelastic. To get an idea of high frequency changes in
national bank circulation, for the period 1881 to 1910 we plot the percentage changes in total
circulation between call report dates for each of the ﬁve call reports that national banks were
required to ﬁle each year. (Although these call reports are not at evenly spaced time intervals,
we have treated them as such for purposes of plotting the data.) This is done in Figure 2.6
This ﬁgure makes two points. First, there was not much high frequency ﬂuctuation in the
quantity of national bank notes in circulation. The average absolute percentage change was
only 2.5 percent. Further, there are only 19 times, out of the 150 observations in Figure
2, in which national bank circulation changed by more than ﬁve percent in either direction
between call reports and only 4 times in which it increased more than ten percent in either
direction.
However, we disagree that the cause of the inelasticity was exogenous, rather than
being the result of optimizing behavior on the part of banks. There are three reasons. First,
banks held government bonds beyond that required to collateralize their circulation. Since
6Weber 2000 has compiled the disaggregated call reports by state and reserve city for each call report date.
All national bank data used in this paper are aggregates of these data, rather than the aggregates reported by
the Comptroller of the Currency. The reason is in many cases the totals given in the Comptroller’s aggregates
do not agree with the totals from this disaggregated reports.
5the tax was only on circulation, it would have been costless for banks to have idle notes in
their vaults to meet increased demands. Second, much of the increased demand for notes was
predictable due to its seasonality so the mechanics of note issue would not have prevented
national banks from having additional notes on hand in a timely manner. Third, there were
large secular (low frequency) movements in national bank note circulation. We have plotted
the level of national bank note circulation at each call report date in Figure 3.7 The ﬁgure
shows that bank note circulation declined by slightly over 60 percent between the end of 1881
and the end of 1890. After that, circulation increased slowly until the end of 1899 after which
it increased at a far more rapid pace. By 1913, national bank note circulation was more than
six times greater than it was in 1890.
3. The model
We consider an overlapping generations economy with two-period lived households
and two locations. Time is discrete, inﬁnite, and indexed by t =0 ,1,....T h e r ei s a s i n g l e ,
non-storable consumption good, denoted x(t),i ne a c hl o c a t i o ni ne a c hp e r i o d .C o n s u m p t i o n
goods are not transferable across locations. Locations are physically distinct, so that it is not
possible for agents or banks to communicate across locations.
Ac o n t i n u u mo fi d e n t i c a lh o u s e h o l d so fm e a s u r eo n ei sb o r ni ne a c hl o c a t i o ni ne a c h
period. Half of the measure of households in each location, “lenders”, receive an endowment
of the consumption good zt(t) > 0 only in the ﬁrst period of life. The other households,
“borrowers”, receive an endowment of the consumption good y∗
t(t+1)> 0 only in the second
7We also examined net circulation, measured as total circulation less holdings of bills of other banks, of
national bank notes. The movements in the two series are virtually identical, so we did not plot net circulation
in the ﬁgure or discuss it in the text.
6period of life. We assume that although the money in this economy is commodity money, it
does not yield any direct utility to the holders.
There are also a large number of banks in each of the two locations. These banks are
inﬁnitely lived (although one could think of banks as also two-period lived with a new cohort
of banks coming into existence in each period). These banks can take deposits, issue bank
notes, and make loans.
Lenders do not necessarily remain in the same location for their entire lives. Some
measure of lenders of each cohort spend the ﬁrst period of their lives at one location and
the second period of their lives at the other location. Although whether or not a particular
young lender has to move and the measure of young lenders that have to move are public
information, this information is not revealed until the end of the agent’s ﬁrst period of life.
The probability that a young lender of cohort t will move is π(t,j),w h e r ej = g,b is the
state of the economy at time t.T h e r e a r e t w o s t a t e s , g o o d ( g) and bad (b), such that
π(t,g) < π(t,b). That is, fewer young lenders have to move in the good state than have to
move in the bad state. Thus, the bad state can be thought of as a bank run. The probability
that the good state occurs at time t is α(t,g).
It is the combination of impossibility of communication across locations with the fact
that some households must move that gives rise to the need for banknotes. The impossibility
of communication means that a household (or bank) in one location cannot verify that the
check written on a bank in another location is good (not counterfeit) or not. Banknotes are
not counterfeitable, by assumption. Thus, a young household that has to move will want
bank notes or specie, since deposits will be useless in its new location. The assumption that
bank notes can be used for transactions at far locations, whereas deposits are restricted to
7near locations, is an attempt to capture the transactions facts of the national banking period.
Speciﬁcally, Sprague 1910 says, “A far more serious cause of disturbance from the suspension
of payments is the dislocation of the domestic exchanges. In making payments at a distance
local substitutes for money will not serve. When banks in one locality refuse to remit to
banks elsewhere upon drafts and checks sent to them for payment business must soon come
to a standstill.” (p. 75)
A national bank had to pay a tax on the amount of its notes in circulation. In
addition, it was charged for costs of sorting and shipping any of its notes that were presented
for redemption through the redemption facility at the U.S. Treasury. Further, national banks
incurred ﬁxed costs, the wages of tellers and the cost of having a vault, associated with note
issue. With these considerations in mind, we model the costs of note issuance as follows.
Banks can issue two kinds of notes. There are “cheap” notes, denoted B(t,j),w h i c hi tc a n
issue in state j in time t. These notes carry a redemption cost of cB ≥ 0 per note, payable in
period t+1. There are also “expensive” notes, denoted N(t,j), which it can issue in state j in
time t. These notes carry a redemption cost of cN >c B per note, also payable in period t+1.
The reason that banks would ever choose to issue expensive notes is that there is a maximum
amount of cheap notes, β(t), that a bank can issue in any period. What we are trying to
capture with the maximum on cheap note issuance is the idea that banks expect that there
is some quantity of notes, β(t), that will stay in circulation for a relatively long period of
time. However, they also expects that notes issued beyond that quantity, particularly those
issued in terms of high demand, will be returned to the bank (presented for redemption) very
quickly. It is the presence of the upper bound on cheap note issue that drives the results of
the model.
8The timing of transactions, the revelation of the state of the economy, and the moving
of households is shown in Figure 4. At the beginning of a period of life, young lenders receive
their endowments of the consumption good. They then decide how much of this endowment
to deposit in one of the banks in the economy. After making the deposit, each young lender
consumes. After this, young borrowers arrive at banks and take out loans at the non-state
contingent gross nominal interest rate R(t) ∈ <+. They then consume the consumption goods
that they have borrowed.
Next old borrowers receive their endowments of the consumption good. They sell part
of this endowment to old lenders for deposits, banknotes, and specie. They then consume
the rest of their endowment, and they take the deposits, banknotes, and specie to banks to
pay oﬀ the loans that they took out in the previous period. Old lenders consume the goods
that they bought with their deposit, banknotes, and specie.
After banks receive payment for the loans they made last period, they adjust their
holdings of specie to the desired level given the amount of deposits they have taken from and
the loans they have made to the current period young. Thus, we are implicitly assuming that
there is a market where banks can trade specie for goods or goods for specie at p(t) > 0,
the inverse of the price level in period t. If we think of our model as strictly of the banking
sector, then this market is the rest of the economy. If we think of our model as the domestic
economy, then this other market is the rest of the world, and banks’ adjustment of specie
holdings corresponds to international specie ﬂows. Under this latter interpretation, we admit
that there is some inconsistency, because we are, in eﬀect, assuming that the economy is a
small country with respect to goods, but a large or at least isolated economy in terms of
capital. However, we chose as we did, because we wanted banks’ decisions regarding reserves
9to be part of the determination of interest rates. After adjusting their specie holdings, banks
i no n el o c a t i o ns e n dt h en o t e st h e yh a v er e c e i v e da sl o a np a y m e n t st ot h eo t h e rl o c a t i o nf o r
redemption, receive back the notes they issued in the previous period, and pay the redemption
costs on these notes.
Finally, the moving shock is revealed. Young lenders who stay in the same location
do nothing. Movers go to their bank and redeem their deposits for specie (lawful money) or
banknotes and then go to their new location.
A. Household behavior
All households have preferences
u[xt(t),x t(t +1 ,j)] = lnxt(t)+δ lnxt(t +1 ,j),
where xk(t,j) ∈ <+ denotes the consumption of a household of cohort k in period t in state j
and δ ∈ (0,1) is the rate of time preference. Households are assumed to maximize expected
lifetime utility subject to their budget constraints. For borrowers the problem is simple:
max
xt(t),xt(t+1)
[lnxt(t)+δlnxt(t +1 ) ]
s.t.
xt(t)+xt(t +1 ) /r(t)=y
∗
t(t +1 ) /r(t)
where r(t)=R(t)p(t +1 ) /p(t) is the gross real rate of interest between periods t and t +1 .
10Solving, borrowers’ nominal demand for loans in period t is
p(t)`(t)=p(t)xt(t)=Y (t +1 ) /R(t)
where Y (t +1 )=( 1+δ)−1y∗(t +1 ) /p(t +1 ) .
The lenders’ problem is more complicated. As we discuss below, banks oﬀer state-
contingent payment schedules for demand deposits. Speciﬁcally, let Rm(t,j) ∈ <+ be the
gross nominal rate of return paid to depositors (lenders) who withdraw early (movers) in
time period t if state j occurs, Rn(t,j) ∈ <+ be the gross nominal rate of return paid to
depositors who do not withdraw early (nonmovers) in time period t if state j occurs, and
D(t) be the nominal deposits of lenders in period t. Then the consumption of movers and
nonmovers in the second period of their lives will be xt(t +1 ,j)=p(t +1 ) Rm(t,j)D(t) and

















Banks take deposits, make loans, and pay out specie and banknotes. We assume that
banks take as given the quantity of deposits, the interest rate at which they can make loans,
the cost of bank note issue, and the constraint on the amount of cheap bank notes they can
issue. However, we allow them to decide how many loans to make, how much specie to hold
as reserves, and how many of each type of banknotes to issue. (We will make assumptions
so that banks will never want to hold excess reserves, but will always want to issue notes.)
Further, we permit banks to choose schedules of interest payments on deposits that depend
upon the state of the economy and whether or not an individual is a mover or a nonmover.
Banks face three constraints on their behavior. First, banks must be able to meet the
withdrawal demands of movers either out of their specie holdings or by issuing bank notes
π(t,j)R
m(t,j)D(t)=S(t)+B(t,j)+N(t,j) ∀t,j. (1)
The lefthand side of (1) is a bank’s obligations in period t, the payments it promises to
movers. The righthand side is a bank’s resources to meet these obligations — its nominal
specie holdings, denoted S(t), and its issuance of both kinds of banks notes.
Second, in period t +1 , banks must be able to meet the withdrawal demands of




Third, banks face the overall resource constraint that their loans plus reserves must
12equal their deposits
L(t)+S(t)=D(t) ∀t. (3)
The equilibrium concept that we use is Nash equilibrium. Given that there are a large
number of banks, this choice has two immediate implications. The ﬁrst is that in equilibrium
banks will earn zero proﬁts, because if banks are earning proﬁts, then there is an incentive
for an individual bank to deviate and oﬀer higher interest rates on deposits and thus attract
all depositors. The second is that the deposit contracts oﬀered by banks in equilibrium will
maximize the utility of households, because if they do not, once again there are incentives
for an individual bank to deviate.








m(t,j)D(t)] + [1 − π(t,j)]ln[R
n(t,j)D(t)]}
s u b j e c tt o( 1 ) ,( 2 ) ,( 3 )
S(t) ≤ D(t) (4)
B(t,j) ≤ β(t) (5)
S(t) ≥ 0,a n dB(t,j) ≥ 0. The maximization is over {Rm(t,j),R n(t,j),L(t),S(t),B (t,j),
N(t,j)}.
Substitute for L(t) using (3) and let λ(t,j),θ(t,j),µ(t),ν(t,j) be the Lagrange mul-









− θ(t,j)D(t)=0 , ∀t, j (7)
λ(t,j) − cBθ(t,j) − ν(t,j) ≤ 0, ∀t, j with equality if B(t,j) > 0 (8)
λ(t,j) − cNθ(t,j) ≤ 0, ∀t, j with equality if N(t,j) > 0 (9)
λ(t,g)+λ(t,b) − R(t)[θ(t,g)+θ(t,b)] − µ(t) ≤ 0, ∀t with equality if S(t) > 0 (10)
µ(t) ≥ 0, with equality if S(t) <D (t) (11)
ν(j) ≥ 0, ∀t, j with equality if B(t,j) < β(t) (12)
and the constraints.
C. Market clearing
The market that has to clear in this model is that for loans. The quantity of loans
sought by borrowers has to be equal to quantity of loans that banks are willing to make.
That is
Y (t +1 ) /R(t)=D(t) − S(t). (13)
D. Equilibrium
For deﬁning equilibrium in this economy, we face a choice of whether to take prices or
t h eq u a n t i t yo fs p e c i ea se x o g e n o u s .W ec h o o s ep r i c e sf o rt h er e a s o n sg i v e na b o v e .
14Definition 1. Positive reserves and note issuance equilibrium.
Given {z(t),y ∗(t),p(t),β(t),α(t,j),π(t,j)}, δ, cB,a n dcN, as e t{Rm(t,j),R n(t,j),R(t),
S(t) > 0,B(t,j) > 0,N(t,j) ≥ 0} is a Nash equilibrium with positive reserves and
note issuance if it satisﬁes household and bank maximization and loan market clearing.
The following lemma will be useful for the discussion which follows:
Lemma 1. Any positive reserves and note issuance equilibrium will have the properties:
1. [β(t) − B(t,j)]N(t,j)=0 ,
2. cB ≤ R(t) ≤ cN,
3. cB ≤
Rn(t,j)
Rm(t,j) with equality if B(t,j) < β(t),
4.
Rn(t,j)
Rm(t,j) ≤ cN with equality if N(t,j) > 0,
5. Rm(t,b) ≤ Rm(t,g) ≤ cN,a n d
6. cB ≤ Rn(t,g) ≤ Rn(t,b).
Proof: Properties (1) through (4) follow directly from the banks’ ﬁrst order conditions.
Properties (5) and (6) follow immediately from Properties (2) through (4).¥
Property (1) states that a bank will not issue expensive notes in a state unless it has
issued all the cheap notes it can in that state. Property (2) states that the nominal interest
rate on loans has to at least cover the cost of issuing cheap notes, but has to be less than or
equal to the cost of issuing expensive notes. This has to hold because at the margin loans are
funded by the issue of bank notes. Properties (3) and (4) states that the ratio of the interest
rates paid to nonmover and movers must always be at least as large as cB, but can never
exceed cN.I fah o u s e h o l dw e r et os w i t c hf r o mb e i n gam o v e rt ob e i n gan o n m o v e r ,t h e nt h e
15bank would save the cost of issuing notes to this household. Competition means that these
costs must be passed on to the household. Property (5) states that the interest rate paid to
movers in the good state will always be at least as great as that paid to movers in the bad
state, but that this interest rate will never exceed the cost of issuing the expensive notes.
Property (6) states that the interest rate paid to nonmovers in the bad state will always be
at least as great at the interest rate paid to movers in the bad state, and this interest rate
will always be greater than the cost of issuing cheap notes.
Assumption P:
cN − π(t,g)cB <
Y (t +1 )
D(t)
<c B ∀t.
This assumption is suﬃcient to guarantee that banks will always want to hold positive
amounts of reserves and to issue notes in both states.
Proposition 1. Under assumption P, a positive reserves and note issuance equilibrium ex-
ists.
Proof: The proof is given in the Appendix.¥
In writing the conditions for equilibrium, we noticed that interest rates could be written
as functions of Y (t+1)/D(t), β(t)/D(t), and the cost and probability parameters. A represen-
tative illustration of interest rate behavior in this model as a function of Y (t+1)/D(t), holding
the values of the parameters and other exogenous variables ﬁxed, is shown in Figure 5. For
small values of Y (t+1)/D(t),w ea r ei nt h ec a s ew h e nb a n k sd on o th i tt h ec o n s t r a i n to nn o t e
issuance in either state. Here, as expected from the Lemma, R(t)=Rn(t,g)=Rn(t,b)=cB
and Rm(t,g)=Rm(t,b)=1 .
16As Y (t+1)/D(t) increases, banks end up holding fewer specie reserves, either because
they have fewer deposits or they are making more loans, if the interest rate is unchanged.
At some point, they will not be able to pay oﬀ movers dollar for dollar when the bad state
occurs because they hit the constraint on issuing cheap banknotes. This has the eﬀect of
raising the marginal cost of funding loans above cB, so that the interest rate on loans has
to rise above cB. However, since the interest rate on loans has not yet risen high enough for
it to be proﬁtable for banks to issue expensive notes in the bad state, Rm(t,b) must be less
than unity. Further, since the return on loans has risen relative to the cost of note issue in
the bad state, the diﬀerence must go to non-movers, meaning that Rn(t,b) >c B. In addition,
since R(t) >c B,t h ep r o ﬁts that banks earn on loans above the cost of note issue in the good
s t a t em u s tb es p l i tb e t w e e nm o v e r sa n dn o n m o v e r s ,s ot h a tRn(t,g) >c B and Rm(t,g) > 1.
As Y (t +1 ) /D(t) continues to increase, eventually R(t) increases to the point that it
now pays banks to issue expensive notes in the bad state. At this point, the slopes of the
interest rate curves change, and for R(t), Rm(t,g), Rn(t,g),a n dRn(t,b) the slopes become
ﬂatter. The reason is that now the marginal cost of funding loans is approximately a weighted
average of cB and cN with constant weights.
Eventually, however, banks reach the point where they are holding so few specie re-
serves that they cannot pay oﬀ movers in the good state with cheap banknotes. After this
point, all interest rates begin increasing until eventually interest rates are high enough so
that it pays banks to also issue expensive notes in both states and we are in the case covered
by the Lemma. Note that in this case the interest rate paid to nonmovers is higher than the
interest rate on loans.
174. Parameterization
We now want to see how well a version of the model parameterized to call report
data on national banks predicts interest rates and bank note circulation. The strategy is
the following. First, we match the national bank data to the theoretical constructs in the
model. Then, we use the call report data and other information to calibrate the probability
and cost parameters in the model. In the next section, we determine how well this calibrated
model performs. The time period we use for comparison is 1882-1910. We choose 1882 as
our starting point, because prior to the Act of July 12, 1882, banks with higher amounts
of paid-in capital were more restricted in the amounts of notes they could issue than were
banks with lower amounts of paid-in capital. This act made the restriction on note issuance
a uniform 90 percent of paid-in capital for all banks. We end in 1910, because that is when
our reliable data on national banks ends.
A. The data
The model constructs that we want to match to the national bank data are note issue,
specie holdings, deposits, and the endowments of borrowers. To do this we have to decide
at what point in the timing of the model the bank balance sheets are being observed. If we
assume that banks’ balance sheets are observed at the end of a period, then banks should not
have specie on their books, since it was all paid out to young movers before the period ended.
If we assume that the balance sheets are observed at the beginning of a period, then banks
do not have any note liabilities, since they don’t have to issue notes until households actually
move later in the period. In actuality, national banks’ balance sheets have both notes and
s p e c i ea tt h es a m et i m e .
18Our solution is to assume that bank balance sheets are observed shortly after the
beginning of a period, so that the current young have had the opportunity to make their
deposits and take out their loans. We also assume that banks have been able to adjust their
specie reserves for the period to the desired level. However, we also assume old borrowers
who have sold part of their endowment for bank notes have not yet had a chance to return
t oab a n kt op a yo ﬀ their loans. Thus, notes outstanding correspond to an amount of loans
made in the previous period.
With this assumption, we map the variables in our analysis into the items on the
balances of national banks as:
Notes: [B(t,j)+N(t,j)] “National Bank circulation.” “State bank circulation” is not in-
cluded since national banks could not issue more of these notes.
Specie: [S(t)] “Fractional currency” + “Trade dollars” + “Specie” + “Legal-tender notes” +
“5% fund with Treasury” + “Due from U.S. Treasury” + “Due from reserve agents.”
The “5% fund with Treasury” is included, because these were funds that national banks
were required to deposit in specie with the U.S. Treasury as reserves for note issue,
but which were also counted as reserves against deposits. The “Due from Treasury”
is included because this is specie owed by the Treasury to national banks due to notes
of other banks that they have sent in for redemption. The “Due from reserve agents”
is included because these were counted as reserves against deposits, and represented
funds that banks could call on to meet demands to redeem deposits.
Deposits: [D(t)] Total liabilities and net worth less notes. Net worth is included as part of
deposits, since national banks used their capital to fund loans.
19Endowment of borrowers: [Y (t+1)] Total assets less specie and notes. Given the assumption
about the timing of the observation of bank balance sheets, notes in circulation are
equal to the unpaid loans of the previous cohort. Thus, subtracting specie and notes
from total assets yields loans made to the current cohort, L(t). The variable we want
in the analysis, however, is the endowment of borrowers, Y (t +1 )=R(t)L(t),w h i c h
involves the gross interest rate. Since the gross real interest rate is close to one, we
ignore it and approximate Y (t +1 )as L(t).8
In Figure 6, we plot these variables normalized by deposits, since such a normalization
will be useful when we compare the predictions of the model with the data. Note that with
this normalization, the fall in notes is still pronounced, but notes as a fraction of deposits
(as we measure them) recovers only very slowly after hitting the minimum in 1890. Also
note that the ratio of loans to deposits appears to ﬂuctuate more than the ratio of notes to
deposits or specie plus notes to deposits, but that is an illusion due to the diﬀerent axes used
for the diﬀerent ratios.
B. Parameters
The next step is to calibrate the probabilities and costs. Our choices:
The probability of being in the good state: α(t,g)=0 .9.W ec h o o s et h eb a s i ct i m ep e r i o do f
the analysis as a year. Sprague 1910 identiﬁes four years — 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907
—i nw h i c hﬁnancial disruptions occurred. Dwyer and Gilbert 1989 point out, however,
8During this period, national bank held deposits for the government — “United States deposits” and
“Deposits U.S. disbursing agents” — which they had to back with government bonds — “Bonds for deposits”
— as collateral. We have treated these like other deposits and loans in terms of our mapping from data to
theory since they were not equal on bank balance sheets, so eliminating them would mean that our asset and
liability measures would not add up.
20that there were only general restrictions of payments in New York City in 1893 and
1907. We come up with our value for α(g) by averaging these occurrences over the
thirty-one years for which we have data.
The probability of moving in the good state: π(t,g)=0 .2. Given that the gross interest rates
during this period were close to one, we can obtain this probability as the ratio of
notes plus specie to deposits from (1). From Figure 6, this value is approximately 0.2
over the period.
The probability of moving in the bad state: π(t,b)=0 .23. We examine the sum of specie
and notes normalized by deposits in the call reports near times that Sprague 1910
identiﬁes as ﬁnancial disruptions. These are marked by black diamonds in Figure 6.
W es e et h a ti nt w oo ft h e s ep a n i c s ,t h e s ev a l u e sw e r ea b o u t3p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t sh i g h e r
than at previous or subsequent call reports. Thus, we added 0.03 to π(t,g) to get the
calibrated value π(t,b)
The cost of issuing cheap notes: cB =1 .01 (1.005 after 1900). We take the cost of issuing
cheap notes to be the tax on notes (1 percent per annum before 1900, one-half percent
thereafter). Thus, in parameterizing the cost of issuing cheap notes we ignore any
of the additional costs associated with note issue, such as those computed by the
Comptroller of the Currency or by Champ 1990, because these costs were quite small.
The cost of issuing expensive notes: cN =1 .05,1.13,1.20 (less .005 after 1900). We assume
that the cost of expensive notes is the tax plus some ﬁxed cost times the number of
times that notes were returned in a year. Although we have no way of calibrating this
ﬁxed cost precisely, the computations in Champ, Freeman, and Weber 1999 suggest
that it is around 20 basis points. If this is correct, then our choices for cN correspond
21to expensive notes remaining in circulation for roughly two weeks, one week, and only
a few days, respectively.
The restriction of the quantity of cheap notes that can be issued as a percentage of deposits:
β(t)/D(t)=0 .06. What we wanted was a value such that the restriction on issuing
cheap notes would in general not be binding, but would bind occasionally, especially
in times of panics. In Figure 6, we have plotted the line for β(t)/D(t)=0 .06. We see
that this value implies that banks were issuing expensive notes at the beginning and
end of our sample period. They also issued them around the time of the crisis of 1893
and in 1897. For most of the rest of the time, however, only cheap notes were being
issued. Thus, our choice for this parameter seems reasonable.
5. Results
We now see how well the parameterized version of our model ﬁts with some actual data
during the period. We keep the values of the parameters constant over the entire time period.
The only exogenous variables that we allow to change are the endowments of borrowers and
lenders. We do this to limit the number of free parameters. We ﬁrst examine how the
predictions of this calibrated model compare to the level and movements in the yields on
long-term government bonds. Then we examine its predictions compared to the discounts on
certiﬁed checks and the interest rates on call loans during periods of ﬁnancial panics. Finally,
we compare the level and movements in note circulation in the calibrated model with actual
note circulation.
22A. Government bond yields
To see how well a calibrated version of our model performed versus actual government
bonds yields, we computed R(t) from our model for each call report date between 1882 and
1910. The actual government bond yields we use for comparison are those on the 4s of
1907 up to 1900 and those on the 2s of 1930 thereafter. We choose these bonds because
they made up the largest component on those held by national banks during this period and
they were the ones for which there was the least uncertainty about call dates that might be
aﬀecting yield computations. The call report data are for various days during a month; the
government bond yield data are all end of month. For the comparisons we used the end of
month observation closest to the call report date.
Comparisons of R(t) from a calibrated version of the model with actual government
bond yields over the period 1882 to 1910 for three diﬀerent values of cN are shown in the
table below.
Model Actual
cN =1 .05 cN =1 .13 cN =1 .20
Mean 1.20 1.60 1.63 2.31
Standard
Deviation 0.273 0.414 .0456 0.474
Correlation
With Actual 0.728 0.464 0.452
The results look quite good for the model. The means of the calibrated series are too low; they
are below the mean of the government bond yields by approximately 70 to 110 basis points.
This is not unexpected. Our choice for cB is very conservative since it does not include
any other costs other than the tax that a national bank might incur due its note issuing
activities. What is more important from our point of view is that the standard deviations of
23the computed and actual series are very close. Thus, we are able to explain the ﬂuctuations
in interest rates during this period.
Further, the correlations between the computed and actual series are all greater than
0.45, which indicates that the computed series tracks the actual series quite well. This is
illustrated in Figure 7, where we show the comparison using R(t) computed with a value of
cN =1 .13 in the calibration. Speciﬁcally, the calibrated model captures the fall in government
bond yields from 1882 to 1890, the rise from 1890 to the middle of 1893, and then the sharp
fall in yields from then to 1900. The calibrated model also captures the increase in bond
yields after 1900, although the ﬁgure shows that the model does a better job of tracking
interest rate movements before 1900 than it does after that.
The ﬁgure further shows that the biggest interest misses are during three panics, those
of 1884, 1893, and 1907. These could be explained by the way we model deposits. Our model
treats deposits as endowments that are not aﬀected by which state occurs. However, if in
actuality households withdraw deposits in bad states and this is captured by the data, it
would lower Y (t +1 ) /D(t) and therefore lower the calibrated model’s R(t).
We also compare our explanation of interest rate ﬂuctuations with that in Champ,
Smith, and Williamson 1996. To do so, we computed interest rates from our model under
the assumption that note issuance was completely inelastic. We used three diﬀerent values
of the ﬁxed level of note issue; β(t)/D(t)=0 .02,0.04,0.06.( V a l u e so fβ(t)/D(t) > 0.06 force
banks to issue too many notes in most periods, and interest rates are negative on average.)
The results are shown in the table below.
24CSW Model Actual
β(t)/D(t)=0 .02 β(t)/D(t)=0 .04 β(t)/D(t)=0 .06
Mean 4.84 2.43 0.111 2.31
Standard
Deviation 1.19 1.17 1.15 0.474
Correlation
With Actual 0.150 0.150 0.149
When note issue is completely inelastic at β(t)/D(t)=0 .04, the mean of the computed
interest rate series are closer to the actual mean than are the interest rates from our model.
However, for other values, the means are either much too high or much too low. Further, for
all β(t)/D(t), the completely inelastic model produces interest rate ﬂuctuations that are far
larger than the actual ﬂuctuations, and the correlations between the computed interest rates
and actual interest rates are lower than those from our model. Thus, the evidence indicates
that our model outperforms the completely inelastic note issue model.
B. Note circulation
Next, we see how well the calibrated version of our model predicts the level and
movements of actual note issue during this period. Our method is similar to that used for
the long term government bond yields, with one major exception. The interest on loans in
the model economy is invariant to the state of the economy; banks’ note issuance is not.
Thus, we have to make an assumption about when the actual economy was in the bad state.
Sprague 1910 designates four periods in which ﬁnancial disruptions occurred: the panic of
May 1884 (Gorton 1988 lists this as occurring in June), the ﬁnancial stringency in November
1890, the crisis from May through September 1893, and the crisis from October through
December 1907. We assume that the actual economy was in the bad state in those periods
around Sprague’s four ﬁnancial disruptions and in the good state otherwise.
25Comparisons of [B(t,j)+N(t,j)]/D(t) from a calibrated version of the model with
actual values over the period 1882 to 1910 for the same three values of cN used above are
s h o w ni nt h et a b l eb e l o w .
Model Actual
cN =1 .05 cN =1 .13 cN =1 .20 cN = cB
Mean 0.045 0.042 0.042 0.047 0.073
Standard
Deviation 0.0088 0.0072 0.0069 0.0096 0.0328
Correlation
With Actual 0.294 0.331 0.305 0.310
The results do not look as good as those for interest rates. The means of the calibrated
series for note issues are only about half those of the actual series. Further, the standard
deviations of note issue for the calibrated model are less than one-fourth as large as the
standard deviation of actual note issues. Thus, the calibrated model demonstrates even more
inelasticity of note issue than was actually the case. Lastly, the correlation between the
model’s predictions and actual is quite low.
The diﬃculties that the model has predicting note circulation is illustrated in Figure
8 ,w h e r ew es h o wt h ec o m p a r i s o nu s i n g[B(t,j)+N(t,j)]/D(t) computed with a value of
cN =1 .13 in the calibration. The calibrated model badly misses the fall in note circulation
from 1882 to 1890, although it does capture to some extent the rise in note circulation after
1900. We checked the extent to which the early miss in circulation was the reason that the
m o d e la p p e a r e dt od os op o o r l y .W h e nt h ep e r i o df r o m1 8 8 2t o1 8 9 0i se l i m i n a t e df r o mt h e
comparison, the diﬀerence between the means of the calibrated model and the actual series
is reduced, but the actual is still larger than the model. The standard deviation of actual
note circulation falls dramatically, and the standard deviation of actual and model become
26virtually the same. However, the correlation between actual and model falls to below 0.1,
indicating that there seems to be no relationship between actual note circulation and that
predicted by the model.
As a ﬁnal exercise, we used the model to determine how much more elastic note
issuance would have had to have been in order to eliminate interest rate ﬂuctuations (other
than those due to changes in the tax on notes) during this period. The result is given in the
column of the table above labeled “cN = cB”. We ﬁnd that mean note issue rises slightly
to 0.47. The standard deviation of note issue becomes 0.0096. Thus, if we consider the
elasticity of note issuance to be its standard deviation, our model says that an increase in
note elasticity of between 8 and 30 percent would have been suﬃcient to eliminate interest
rate ﬂuctuations during this period. The elasticity issue can be viewed in another way. We
computed the value of β(t)/D(t) that would be necessary for interest rates to be equal to the
t a xr a t eo nn o t e s .I tt u r n e do u tt ob eβ(t)/D(t)=0 .1. In other words, our model indicates
that if banks had been able to circulate notes equal to 10 percent of total liabilities plus net
worth less notes rather than just 6 percent as per our calibration, then interest rates would
have been equal to the tax on note circulation.
C. Interest rates during ﬁnancial disruptions
Finally, we examine how well a calibrated version of our model does explaining the
interest rates paid to depositors during periods in which there were ﬁnancial disruptions.
There is no direct evidence on the interest rates paid to depositors under the National Banking
System. However, we can make some inferences about how these rates moved and how high
they might have been, at least during periods of ﬁnancial disruption.
27Before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, when banks suspended
payments on deposits, as they did in 1893 and 1907, they did not close their doors for business.
They continued to go about the normal business of banking, with the exception that they did
not pay out specie for deposits. However, they would certify checks for their depositors. This
basically made the check a liability of the bank and meant that the bank would pay the check
when the suspension of payments ended if the bank were solvent at the time. According to
Sprague 1910, these certiﬁed checks circulated and could be discounted for specie. Sprague
1910 does not present evidence of there being any discounts on certiﬁed checks for the panic of
1884 and the ﬁnancial stringency 1890. However, for the crisis of 1893 he says that discounts
on certiﬁed checks were mostly between 1 and 2 percent, with some of the discounts reaching
4 percent. For the crisis of 1907, he says that discounts were most in the range of 3/4 to
2-1/2 percent, with again some reaching the level of 4 percent. We interpret the fact that
certiﬁed checks could be discounted against specie during periods of ﬁnancial disruption as
meaning that movers received less than a dollar for each dollar of their deposits during such
periods.
Drawing inferences about the interest rates paid to nonmovers is more diﬃcult. Our
approach is to use the interest rate on call loans to provide some information about interest
rates paid to nonmovers. Call loans were loans made to individual based upon stocks as
security. They were referred to as call loans, because they were payable when demanded by
the bank. It is well known that the interest rates on call loans tended to increase sharply and
to be well above government bond yields during periods of ﬁnancial disruption. We think
that the interest rates on such loans provide some information about the interest rate that
nonmover depositors might have been able to earn, because presumably such households had
28the option of withdrawing their funds from banks and making short-term loans directly to
other agents. Although they may not have been able to earn the interest rates on call loans,
we think the returns on such alternatives would tend to move with call money rates. We
interpret the fact that call money rates rose sharply during ﬁnancial disruptions as meaning
that the interest rate paid to nonmovers rose sharply above the rate of interest on loans
during periods of ﬁnancial disruption.9
To see if the calibrated version of the model delivers predictions consistent with these
broad facts, we compute the interest rates paid to movers and nonmovers for our model
designating the periods around Sprague’s four periods of ﬁnancial disruptions as periods in
which the bad state actually occurred. The results are shown in Figure 9. From the ﬁgure we
see that the interest rates paid to movers are usually around one percent or less. However,
in the periods of ﬁnancial disruption, these interest rates fall sharply and become negative,
consistent with discounts on certiﬁed checks. Interest rates paid to nonmovers are usually
very slightly below the interest rate on loans, but in periods of ﬁnancial disruption, they rise
sharply and are above the interest rate on loans during these periods. This is consistent with
increased call loan rates during ﬁnancial disruptions.
We can also examine how well the magnitudes of interest rates for movers and non-
movers during panics periods from our calibrated model match those observed in actuality.
Interest rates paid to movers in panics periods are about a negative 7 or 8 percent in the
calibrated model. As mentioned above, in actuality the discounts on certiﬁed checks were
usually only 1 or 2 percent, although sometimes they got as high as 4 percent. Thus, it
9Here we diﬀer from Champ, Smith, and Williamson 1994. They map call loan rates into R(t) rather than
into Rn(t,j) as we are doing. We prefer our mapping because government bonds more closely resemble loans
in our model. Speciﬁcally, government bonds were safe ﬁnancial securities and had a ﬁxed term to maturity.
29would seem that the calibrated model overpredicts the losses to movers in periods of ﬁnancial
disruption. However, it must be remembered that what is being reported for certiﬁed checks
is the discount, the immediate loss that the holder of the certiﬁed check suﬀers when at-
tempting to convert it to specie. The variable reported for the calibrated model is an interest
rates, the amount that the mover receives at the end of the period as a percentage of the
amount deposited. The time period in the calibration is assumed to be a year. The time
period over which the discount on certiﬁed checks was actually realized by households during
the period we are considering may have been much shorter. Hence, the diﬀerences between
the calibrated model and the discounts reported by Sprague would be of the same order of
magnitude if the discounts were realized over six weeks to half a year. This does not seem
unreasonable. Although the ﬁnancial disruptions of 1884 and 1890 only lasted a few weeks,
the one in 1893 lasted approximately ﬁve months and the Panic of 1907 lasted approximately
three months.
To see how well the calibrated model’s interest rates for nonmovers matches the data,
we plot monthly averages of call rates for 1890 to 1910 in Figure 10. Interest rates for
nonmovers in panic periods in the calibrated model are around 5 percent. Average monthly
call loan rates are far higher during periods of ﬁnancial disruption. In particular, they are over
10 percent during the crisis of 1890 and over 20 percent during the Panic of 1907. However,
the interest rates in the calibrated model are yearly rates; call loan rates are for demand
loans, which would be of a much smaller duration. Thus, if we were to compare the interest
rates paid to nonmovers from the calibrated model to call loan rates averaged over a long
period of time, the diﬀerence in magnitudes would not be that great. For example, in Figure
10, we also plot twelve-month moving averages of call loans rates. The ﬁgure shows that
30during the periods of ﬁnancial disruption, these moving averages are close to the 5 percent
rates from the calibrated model.
6. Conclusion
The so-called National Bank note paradox is that a large and persistent arbitrage
opportunity seemed to go unexploited from the time the National Banking System was es-
tablished until the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. This unexploited arbitrage
opportunity was that the yield on government bonds was consistently above the cost of issuing
national bank notes.
Several authors have attempted to explain this paradox. In this paper, we focus on the
paper by Champ, Smith, and Williamson 1996. They have attempted to explain this paradox
by arguing that national bank note issue was inelastic due to “the mechanics of note issue.”
We agree with them that national bank note issue did not ﬂuctuate much over short periods
of time, but we point out that note displayed large secular ﬂuctuations. Thus, we disagree
that whatever inelasticity there was in national bank issue was due to exogenous factors.
Instead, we think that there were times when national banks could rationally expected that
any additional notes they might issue would be quickly presented for redemption. Because
there were costs associated with note redemption that were independent of the time that
notes were in circulation, these notes were more expensive to issue than notes that would be
in circulation for longer periods.
Thus, we built a model in which national banks could issue two types of notes —
cheap notes and expensive notes — and in which there was an exogenous upper bound on the
quantity of cheap notes that can be issued. We found that such model implies that, at least
31for certain parameter values, interest rates can be above the cost of issuing cheap notes and
that can ﬂuctuate in response to changes in endowments. When we took a calibrated version
of the model to data, we found that it did quite well. It was able to predict both the level
of and changes in the yields on long term-government bonds during the period. However, it
did not do as well in accounting for ﬂuctuations in note issuance. The model displayed more
note inelasticity than the actual data.
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34Appendix
Proof of the Proposition 3.3 (Existence)
Proof: By Assumption P, S(t) > 0,B(t,j) > 0. From the Lemma we know that
Rm(t,j) and Rn(t,j) will be positive and real and R(t) will be positive if R(t) is real. Thus,
it remains to show that R(t) is real.
For the cases in which B(t,b) < β(t) and N(t,g) > 0, that R(t) is real can be seen
by solving the conditions for equilibrium. We consider the other cases one at a time. For
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θ1R + θ2, 0 <B (j) < β
µjR, B(j)=β,Nj)=0





      
      
cBRRn(j), 0 <B (j) < β
λ1jR + λ2j,B (j)=β,Nj)=0
cNRRn(j),N (j) > 0
j = g,b
We now prove the proposition by demonstrating the existence of equilibrium for each
possible note issue case that can occur. It turns out that for all cases, the solution for R is a
quadratic equation. Thus, we check to determine whether
√
b2 − 4ac is positive.
Case II: B(g) < β,B(b)=β,N(b)=0 .
Substituting for RRm(j) and RRn(j), multiplying by cB/[R(θ1 + θ2)], and collecting
terms yields the quadratic equation
0=[ αλ12µ2 +( 1− α)θ1λ12]R
2 + {αµ2(λ22 − cBλ12)+( 1− α)[θ1(λ22 − µ2)+θ2µ2]}R
−αcBλ22µ2 +( 1− α)θ2(λ22 − µ2)
Substituting, we ﬁnd that
b
2 − 4ac = {αµ12(cBλ12 + λ22)+( 1− α)[θ1(λ12 − µ22) − θ2λ12]}
2 +4 α(1 − α)λ12(cBµ2)
2
which is positive since λ12 > 0.
36Case III: B(g) < β,B(b)=β,N(b) > 0.
Substituting for RRm(j) and RRn(j), multiplying by cBcN/[(θ1R + θ2)(ν1R + ν2)],
and collecting terms yields the quadratic equation
0=[ αν1 +( 1− α)θ1]R
2 +[ α(ν2 − cBν1)+( 1− α)(θ2 − cNθ1)]R − [αcBν2 +( 1− α)cNθ2]
Substituting, we ﬁnd that
b
2 − 4ac =[ α(ν1 + cBν2)+( 1− α)(θ2 + cNθ1)]
2 +4 α(1 − α)˜ y(cN − cB)(˜ y − cB˜ β)
which is positive since (˜ y − cB˜ β) > 0.
Case IV: B(g)=β,B(b)=β,N(g)=N(b)=0 .
Substituting for RRm(j) and RRn(j), multiplying by R2, and collecting terms yields
the quadratic equation
0=[ αµ2 +( 1− α)µ1]λ11λ12R
2 + {2[αµ2 +( 1− α)µ1]λ12λ21 − µ1µ2[αλ12 +( 1− α)λ11)]}R
+[αµ2 +( 1− α)µ1]λ21λ22 − µ1µ2[αλ22 +( 1− α)λ21]
Substituting, we ﬁnd that
b
2 − 4ac = {µ1µ2[αλ12 +( 1− α)λ11]}
2 > 0.
Case V: B(g)=β,B(b)=β,N(g)=0 ,N(b) > 0.
37Substituting for RRm(j) and RRn(j), multiplying by multiplying by cN/[R(ν1 +ν2)],
and collecting terms yields the quadratic equation
0=[ αλ12µ2 +( 1− α)θ1λ12]R
2 + {αµ2(λ22 − cBλ12)+( 1− α)[θ1(λ22 − µ2)+θ2µ2]}R
−αcBλ22µ2 +( 1− α)θ2(λ22 − µ2)





which is positive since λ11 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3 (Positivity)
Proof: We know from the loan market clearing condition (13) that S(t)/D(t)=1−
Y (t+1)
R(t)D(t). The right hand side of this equality cannot be smaller than 1 −
Y (t+1)
cBD(t) since cB is a
lower bound on R(t), by Property (2) of the Lemma. So, by the assumption, S(t) > 0.
From the resource constraint of the banks (3), we have
B(t,g)=π(t,g)R
m(t,g)D(t) − S(t) − N(t,g). (14)
But we know that B(t,g)=β > 0 whenever N(t,g) > 0. Therefore we are only interested in
the case where N(t,g)=0 . Substituting for S(t) in (14), we can express B(t,g) as
B(t,g)/D(t)=π(t,g)R
m(t,g) − 1+
Y (t +1 )
R(t)D(t)
.
38Since we want B(t,g) > 0 we need to ﬁnd a lower bound on Rm(t,g).L e t u s s h o w t h a t
Rm(t,g) ≥ cB/cN. By way of contradiction, suppose that this is not true. Then using
Property (4) of the Lemma, we have that cB = cN
cB
cN >c NRm(t,j) ≥ Rn(t,j).B u t t h i s











Y (t +1 )
cND(t)
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from S(t) > 0.¥
















2's, 1930Figure 2 -- Percentage changes in National Bank Note
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